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Abstract
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software that monitors a single or a
network of computers for malicious activities (attacks) that are aimed at stealing
or censoring information or corrupting network protocols. Most techniques used
in today’s IDS are not able to deal with the dynamic and complex nature of cyber
attacks on computer networks. Hence, efficient adaptive methods like various
techniques of machine learning can result in higher detection rates, lower false
alarm rates and reasonable computation and communication costs. In this paper,
we study several such schemes and compare their performance. We divide the
schemes into methods based on classical artificial intelligence (AI) and methods
based on computational intelligence (CI). We explain how various characteristics
of CI techniques can be used to build efficient IDS.
1 Introduction
Today, political and commercial entities are increasingly engaging in sophisticated
cyber-warfare to damage, disrupt, or censor information content in computer net-
works [6]. In designing network protocols, there is a need to ensure reliability against
intrusions of powerful attackers that can even control a fraction of parties in the
network. The controlled parties can launch both passive (e.g., eavesdropping, non-
participation) and active attacks (e.g., jamming, message dropping, corruption, and
forging).
Intrusion detection is the process of dynamically monitoring events occurring in a
computer system or network, analyzing them for signs of possible incidents and often
interdicting the unauthorized access [4]. This is typically accomplished by automati-
cally collecting information from a variety of systems and network sources, and then
analyzing the information for possible security problems.
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Motivation Traditional intrusion detection and prevention techniques, like firewalls,
access control mechanisms, and encryptions, have several limitations in fully protecting
networks and systems from increasingly sophisticated attacks like denial of service.
Moreover, most systems built based on such techniques suffer from high false positive
and false negative detection rates and the lack of continuously adapting to changing
malicious behaviors. In the past decade, however, several Machine Learning (ML)
techniques have been applied to the problem of intrusion detection with the hope of
improving detection rates and adaptability. These techniques are often used to keep
the attack knowledge bases up-to-date and comprehensive.
Study Approach In this paper, we study several papers that use ML methods for
detecting malicious behavior in distributed computer systems. There is a huge body
of work in this area thus, we decided to carefully select a few papers based on two
factors: diversity and citations count. By diversity we mean most ML techniques for
IDS are covered but only one paper is picked from the set of papers that use the same
technique. Also, the papers are chosen based on their citations count as this factor
greatly shows how much the corresponding work has influenced the community. All
non-survey papers studied here are cited at least 100 times.
Paper Organization In Section 2, we briefly state the main challenges in intrusion
detection and describe two general approaches for solving these problems. In Section 3,
we review several intrusion detection techniques based on traditional AI. In section 4,
we define various core methods of computational intelligence and describe several CI-
based algorithms proposed in the literature.
2 Challenges and Approaches
An IDS generally has to deal with problems such as large network traffic volumes,
highly uneven data distribution, the difficulty to realize decision boundaries between
normal and abnormal behavior, and a requirement for continuous adaptation to a
constantly changing environment [14]. In general, the challenge is to efficiently capture
and classify various behaviors in a computer network. Strategies for classification of
network behaviors are typically divided into two categories: misuse detection and
anomaly detection [4].
Misuse detection techniques examine both network and system activity for known
instances of misuse using signature matching algorithms. This technique is effective
at detecting attacks that are already known. However, novel attacks are often missed
giving rise to false negatives. Alerts may be generated by the IDS, but reaction to
every alert wastes time and resources leading to instability of the system. To overcome
this problem, IDS should not start elimination procedure as soon as the first symptom
has been detected but rather it should be patient enough to collect alerts and decide
based on the correlation of them.
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Anomaly detection systems rely on constructing a model of user behavior that is
considered normal. This is achieved by using a combination of statistical or machine
learning methods to examine network traffic or system calls and processes. The detec-
tion of novel attacks is more successful using the anomaly detection approach as any
deviant behavior is classified as an intrusion. However, normal behavior in a large and
dynamic system is not well defined and it changes over the time. This often results
in a substantial number of false alarms known as false positives. A network-based
IDS looks at the incoming network traffic for patterns that can signify whether a per-
son is probing the network for vulnerable computers. Since responding to each alert
consumes relatively large amounts of time and resources, IDS should not respond to
every alert it generates. Disregarding this fact may result in a self-inflicted denial-of-
service. To overcome this problem, alerts should be aggregated and correlated in order
to produce fewer but more expressive and remarkable alerts.
Machine Learning Approaches We divide the ML-based approaches to intrusion
detection into two categories: approaches based on Artificial Intelligence (AI) tech-
niques and approaches based on Computational Intelligence (CI) methods. AI tech-
niques refer to the methods from the domain of classical AI like statistical modeling
and while CI techniques refer to nature-inspired methods that are used to deal with
complex problems that classical methods are unable to solve. Important CI methodolo-
gies are evolutionary computation, fuzzy logic, artificial neural networks, and artificial
immune systems. CI is different from the well-known field of AI. AI handles symbolic
knowledge representation, while CI handles numeric representation of information. Al-
though the boundary between these two categories is not always clear and many hybrid
methods have been proposed in the literature, most previous work are mainly designed
based on either of the categories. Moreover, it would be quite useful to understand
how well nature-based techniques perform in contrast to classical methods.
3 AI-based Techniques
Laskov et al. [7] develop an experimental framework for comparative analysis of super-
vised (classification) and unsupervised learning (clustering) techniques for detecting
malicious activities. The supervised methods evaluated in this work include decision
trees, k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN), Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP), and Support Vector
Machines (SVM). The unsupervised algorithms include γ-algorithm, k-means cluster-
ing, and single linkage clustering. They define two scenarios for evaluating the afore-
mentioned learning algorithms from both categories. In the first scenario, they assume
that training and test data come from the same unknown distribution. In the second
scenario, they consider the case where the test data comes from new (i.e., unseen) at-
tack patterns. This scenario helps us understand how much an IDS can generalize its
knowledge to new malicious patterns, which is often very essential for an IDS system
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Figure 1: Average of detection rates for methods evaluated in [7] in two scenarios:
test data contains only known attacks (left) and test data contains unknown attacks
(right).
since today’s sophisticated adversaries tend to use several intrusion patterns to escape
from modern IDS.
The results of [7] show that the supervised algorithms in general show better clas-
sification accuracy on the data with known attacks (the first scenario). Among these
algorithms, the decision tree algorithm has achieved the best results (95% true pos-
itive rate, 1% false-positive rate). The next two best algorithms are the MLP and
the SVM, followed by the k-nearest neighbor algorithm. However, if there are unseen
attacks in the test data, then the detection rate of supervised methods decreases sig-
nificantly. This is where the unsupervised techniques perform better as they do not
show significant difference in accuracy for seen and unseen attacks. Figure 1 shows the
average true/false positive rates of all methods evaluated in [7]. As the plots show, the
supervised techniques generally perform better although unsupervised methods give
more robust results in both scenarios.
Zanero and Savaresi [17] introduce a two-tier anomaly-based architecture for IDS
in TCP/IP networks based on unsupervised learning: the first tier is an unsupervised
clustering algorithm, which build small-size patterns from the network packets payload.
In other words, TCP or UDP packet are assigned to two clusters representing normal
and abnormal traffic. The second tier is an optimized traditional anomaly detection
algorithm improved by the availability of data on the packet payload content. The
motivation behind the work is that unsupervised learning methods are usually more
powerful in generalization of attack patterns than supervised methods thus, there is a
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hope that such an architecture can resist polymorphic attacks more efficiently.
Lee and Solfo [8] build a classifier to detect anomalies in networks using data mining
techniques. They implement two general data mining algorithms that are essential
in describing normal behavior of a program or user. They propose an agent-based
architecture for intrusion detection systems, where the learning agents continuously
compute and provide the updated detection models to the agents. They conduct
experiments on Sendmail1 system call data and network tcpdump data to demonstrate
the effectiveness of their classification models in detecting anomalies. They finally
argue that the most important challenge of using data mining approaches in intrusion
detection is that they require a large amount of audit data in order to compute the
profile rule sets.
Sommer and Paxson [13] study the imbalance between the extensive amount of
research on ML-based intrusion detection versus the lack of operational deployments
of such systems. They identify challenges particular to network intrusion detection
and provide a set of guidelines for fortifying future research on ML-based intrusion
detection. More specifically, they argue that an anomaly-based IDS requires outlier
detection2 while the classic application of ML is a classification problem that deals
with finding similarities between activities. It is true that in some cases, an outlier
detection problem can be modeled as a classification problem in which there are two
classes: normal and abnormal. In machine learning, one needs to train a system with
training patterns of all classes while in anomaly detection one can only train on normal
patterns. This means that anomaly detection is better for finding variations of known
attacks, rather than previously unknown malicious activity. This is why ML methods
have been applied to spam detection more effectively than to intrusion detection.
4 CI-based Techniques
In this section, we review several algorithms based on the four core techniques of
computational intelligence: genetic algorithms (Section 4.1), artificial neural networks
(Section 4.2), fuzzy logic (Section 4.3), and artificial immune systems (Section 4.4).
4.1 Genetic Algorithms (GA)
Genetic algorithms are aimed at finding optimal solutions to problems. Each potential
solution to a problem is represented as a sequence of bits (genes) called a genome
or chromosome. A genetic algorithm begins with a set of genomes (population) and
an evaluation function called fitness function that measures the quality (goodness) of
each genome. The algorithm uses two reproduction operators called crossover and
1Sendmail is an email routing API that supports several mail-transfer and delivery protocols such
as SMTP used for email transport over the Internet.
2Detecting deviations from known attacks.
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mutation to create new descendants (solutions), which are then evaluated. Crossover
determines how various properties of the parents in a population are inherited by the
descendants. Mutation is the spontaneous alteration of a single gene.
Sinclair et al. [12] use genetic algorithms and decision trees to create rules for an
intrusion detection expert system, which supports the analyst’s job in differentiating
anomalous network activity from normal network traffic. In this work, GA is used to
evolve simple rules for network traffic. Each rule is represented by a genome and the
initial population of genomes is a set of random rules. Each genome is comprised of
29 genes: 8 for source IP, 8 for destination IP, 6 for source port, 6 for destination port,
and 1 for protocol.
The fitness function is based on the actual performance of each rule on a pre-
classified data set. An analyst marks a data set comprised of connections as either
normal or abnormal. The system uses analyst-created training sets for rule develop-
ment and analyst decision support. If a rule completely matches an abnormal connec-
tion, then it is rewarded a bonus and if it matches a normal connection it is penalized.
Hence, the generations are biased toward rules that match intrusive connections only.
Once the genetic algorithm reaches a certain number of generations, it stops and the
best genomes (i.e., rules) are selected. The generated rule set can be used as knowledge
inside the IDS for judging whether the network connection and related behaviors are
potential intrusions.
The traditional GA tends to converge to a single best solution called global max-
imum. Since, the algorithm of [12] requires a group of best unique rules, a nature-
inspired technique called niching that attempts to create subpopulations which con-
verge on local maxima. Details of various niching techniques are described in [10].
Li [9] describes a few disadvantages of the algorithm proposed in [12] and defines
a new technique for defining IDS rules. They argue that in order to detect intrusive
behaviors for a local network, network connections should be used to define normal and
abnormal behaviors. An attack can sometimes be as simple as scanning for available
ports in a server or a password-guessing scheme. But typically they are complex and are
generated by automated tools. So, one needs to use temporal and spatial information of
network connections to define IDS rules that can classify complex anomalous activities
using an efficient genetic algorithm.
4.2 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
A neural network consists of a collection of processing units called neurons that are
highly interconnected according to a given topology. ANN have the ability to learning
by example and generalize from limited, noisy, and incomplete data. They have been
successfully employed in a broad spectrum of data-intensive applications.
Mukkamala et al. [11] describe approaches to intrusion detection using neural net-
works and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Their goal is to discover patterns or fea-
tures that describe user behavior to build classifiers for recognizing anomalies. SVM
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are supervised learning machines that represent the training vector in high-dimensional
feature space and label each vector by its class. SVM define an upper bound on the
margin (separation) between different classes to minimize the generalization error,
which is the amount of error in classification of unknown vectors. SVM classify data
by determining a set of training data called support vectors that approximate a hy-
perplane in feature space.
Mukkamala et al. [11] use an SVM for non-linear classification3 of feature vectors in
an IDS. The SVM is trained with 7312 data points and test with 6980 test points from
KDD4. Each point is located on a 41-dimensional space and the training is done using
the radial basis function (RBF)5. The RBF is used to approximate the non-linear
hyperplane that separates the normal and abnormal classes. Using this SVM, they
reach an accuracy of 99.5% in classification of test points. They also use three multi-
layer feed-forward ANN to classify the same test points. The ANN are trained using
the same 7312-point training set. The best result from experimenting the different
ANN architectures is a detection rate of 99.25%. The authors conclude that although
their SVM IDS shows higher detection rates than their ANN, SVM can only be used
for binary classification, which is a big limitation for IDS that require multiple classes.
4.3 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is a method to computing based on degrees of truth rather than the usual
true or false Boolean logic on which the modern computers are based. With fuzzy
spaces, fuzzy logic allows an object to belong to different classes at the same time.
This makes fuzzy logic a great choice for intrusion detection because the security itself
includes fuzziness and the boundary between the normal and anomaly is not well
defined. Moreover, the intrusion detection problem involves many numeric attributes
in collected data, and various derived statistical measures. Building models directly
on numeric data usually causes high detection errors. An behavior that deviates only
slightly from a model may not be detected or a small change in normal behavior may
cause a false positive. With fuzzy logic, it is possible to model this small deviations to
keep the false positive/negative rates small. Every fuzzy rule has the following general
form,
IF condition THEN conclusion [weight],
where condition is a fuzzy expression defined using fuzzy logic operators like fuzzy AND
and fuzzy OR, conclusion is an atomic expression, and weight is a real number in [0, 1]
3When the set of normal and abnormal points in a feature space cannot be divided with a line (or
hyperplane), a non-linear function (hypersurface) is required to separate the two classes.
4Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) is a set of benchmark data created by MIT’s
Lincoln Labs and is considered a standard benchmark for intrusion detection. It contains raw TCP/IP
dump data for a local-area network (LAN) that is under several attacks.
5Any function φ that satisfies the property φ(x) = φ(‖x‖) is a radial function, where ‖x‖ is the
distance of x from an origin.
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that shows the confidence of the rule.
Gomez and Dasgupta [2] show that with fuzzy logic, the false alarm rate in deter-
mining intrusive activities can be reduced. They define a set of fuzzy rules to define the
normal and abnormal behavior in a computer network, and a fuzzy inference engine
to determine intrusions. They use a genetic algorithm to generate fuzzy classifiers,
which is a set of fuzzy rules in the form defined above. Each fuzzy rule is represented
by a genome and the GA is used to find the best genomes (fuzzy rules) to be added
to the fuzzy classifier. The authors conducted experiments using the KDD evaluation
data to classify 22 different types of attacks into 4 intrusion classes: denial of service
(DoS), unauthorized access from a remote machine (R2L), unauthorized access to lo-
cal superuser (root) privileges (U2R), and probing (PRB). The results show that their
algorithm achieves an overall true positive rate of 98.95% and a false positive rate of
7%.
4.4 Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
Natural immune systems consist of molecules, cells, and tissues that establish body’s
resistance to infections caused by pathogens like bacteria, viruses, and parasites. They
distinguish pathogens from self cells and eliminate the pathogens. This provides a
great source of inspiration for computer security systems, especially IDS. An artificial
immune system is a computationally intelligent system based on behavior of the natural
immune systems.
The first immune-inspired model applicable to various computer security problems
was proposed by Hofmeyr and Forrest [3]. Their model is specialized to detect in-
trusions in local area networks based on TCP/IP. They build a database containing
normal sequences of system calls that act as the self definition of the normal behavior
of a program, and as the basis to detect anomalies6. Each TCP connection is modeled
by a triple, which encodes address of sender, address of receiver and port number of
the receiver. Detectors are generated randomly through negative selection algorithm
(NSA). In addition to NSA that results in a signal to stimulate or tolerate the immune
response, they used a second signal (called co-stimulation) to confirm the anomaly that
was detected through NS procedure. In this system, a human is required to generate
this signal manually in order to reduce false alarms (autoimmunity) of the system.
Kim et al. [5] provide an introduction and analysis of the key developments within
the field of immune-inspired computer security as well as suggestions for future re-
search. They summarize six immune features that are desirable for an effective IDS:
distributed, multi-layered, self-organised, lightweight, diverse and disposable. They
explain that the human immune system is distributed through immune networks and
it generates unique antibody sets to provide the first four requirements. It is self-
organized through gene library evolution, negative selection, and clonal. Finally, it
6This work later inspired the work of [8] described in Section 3.
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is lightweight through approximate binding, memory cells, and gene expression to
increase efficiency.
Zamani et al. [15, 16] describe an artificial immune algorithm for intrusion detection
in distributed systems based on danger theory, a immunological model based on the
idea that the immune system does not recognize between self and non-self, but rather
between events that cause damage. The authors propose a multi-agent environment
that computationally emulates the behavior of natural immune systems is effective in
reducing false positive rates. They show the effectiveness of their model in practice
by performing a case study on the problem of detecting distributed denial-of-service
attacks in wireless sensor networks.
Dasgupta [1] proposes a multi-agent IDS based on AIS. He defines three types of
agents: monitoring agents that roam around the network and monitor various parame-
ters simultaneously at multiple levels (user to packet level), communicator agents that
are used to play the role of signals between immune cells called lymphokines and de-
cision/action agents to make decisions based on collected local warning signals. Roles
of each type of agents is unique, though they may work in collaboration. This work
unfortunately does not provide any experimental results making it difficult for the
reader to compare the performance of the proposed system with other ML-based IDS.
5 Conclusion
We reviewed several influential algorithms for intrusion detection based on various
machine learning techniques. Characteristics of ML techniques makes it possible to
design IDS that have high detection rates and low false positive rates while the system
quickly adapts itself to changing malicious behaviors. We divided these algorithms
into two types of ML-based schemes: Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Computational
Intelligence (CI). Although these two categories of algorithms share many similari-
ties, several features of CI-based techniques, such as adaptation, fault tolerance, high
computational speed and error resilience in the face of noisy information, conform the
requirement of building efficient intrusion detection systems.
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